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Abstrat We examine the inuene of management of the opinion of a
group members, while the group of agents are onsidered with dierent om-
muniation strutures. We onsider the optimization problem in dynamis
with feedbak information struture. In the model, the ommuniation stru-
ture plays an important role sine not all agents are diretly onneted with
eah other. The inuene of the agents on eah other is taken into aount
in the equation of dynamis of agents' opinions. An agent weights the other
agents' opinions and after that forms the next step opinion. Two types of
ommuniation strutures are onsidered in the model. The results of nu-
merial modeling illustrate the inuene of some parameters of the model
(ontrol, inuene power of agents on eah other) on the optimal opinion
dynamis.
Keywords: opinion dynamis, average opinion, feedbak optimal ontrol,
Bellman funtion, ommuniation struture.
1. Introdution
Deision making often takes plae as a result of onsensus reahed after ne-
gotiations. De Groot model (De Groot, 1974) is a pioneer work in this area and
one of the simplest models used in modeling negotiations initiated to reah a on-
sensus. In this model, the opinion of the partiipants hanges during the nego-
tiations, depending on their "degree of trust" to eah other. And a onsensus is
reahed if there is a limit matrix of inuene. The formation of publi opinion un-
der the inuene of various soial fators is desribed in the Friedkin-Johnsen model
(Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990), whih is an analogue of the De Groot model. As the
authors emphasize, this pattern establishes the pattern of interation in large and
small-sized soial ommunities.
In the dynamis of Hegselmann-Krause (Hegselmann and Krause, 2005), par-
tiipants exhange opinions only with those who are the part of their "irle of
ommuniation". The size of this "irle" an be hanged, so we an examine the
large groups of agents, as well as the small ommunities. In this ase, reahing a
⋆
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onsensus is diretly related to the number of subgroups into whih the whole group
of agents is divided, and the opinions are hanged due to "averaging". Reahing a
onsensus in a group with enters of inuene is desribed in (Bauso et al., 2016;
Bure et al., 2017). We should also notie the models (Weisbuh et al., 2005; Sirbu
et al., 2016). In the mentioned papers, there is no partiipant who ontrols the opin-
ions of other agents, and all agents are symmetri. In (Mazalov and Parilina, 2020),
the problem of ontrol of the agents' opinions via inuene on some agents of a
soial network is examined. In this setting, players ontrol the agents' opinions.
The purpose of ontrol is to make the average opinion of agents as loser as pos-
sible to the desired one. Modeling of the dynami proess is made for a graph
represented soiety. The graph ommuniation struture inuenes the oopera-
tion struture as well (see Parilina and Sedakov, 2014). The models on opinion on-
trols with feedbak information struture are examined in (Sedakov and Zhen, 2019;
Rogov and Sedakov, 2020; Dorofeeva, 2020).
However, in most papers the ommuniation struture of the agents has not
taken into aount. This fator is important, sine the presene or absene of om-
muniation between ommunity members diretly aets the proess of forming
opinions in their iterations. The paper is devoted to the opinion dynamis taking
into aount the struture of interations between the agents, as well as assessing
the inuene of ontrol on the nally formed opinions.
The paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 ontains a general desription of
the model without speifying ommuniation strutures. In Setion 3 we introdue
a model with a ommuniation struture given by a omplete graph and nd the
optimal ontrol for a given problem. In Setion 4 we examine the model with inom-
plete ommuniation struture in whih one link is deleted from omplete struture.
Numerial simulations demonstrating the results of the previous setions are given
in Setion 5. We briey onlude in Setion 6.
2. Model
We onsider the opinion dynamis in the soiety with an innite time horizon.
A soiety is represented by a pair of (N, g), where N is a nite set of soiety agents,
and g is a graph that reets the ommuniation struture of the soiety. Graph
g = (N,E) is dened by N , the set of verties, and E, the set of edges. Besides the
soiety agents, there is an independent member of the soiety, alled player, who
ontrols the opinion of the agents. As an example, we an onsider the media enter
as a player inuening the agents' opinions. The dynamis of opinions in the model
is given by









+ ui(t), i ∈ N, (1)
where xi(t) ∈ R1 is an opinion of agent i at time t, Si = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} is the set
of neighbors of agent i in graph g, ai ∈ R+ is a oeient dened for any soiety
agent, ui ∈ U ⊂ [0,∞) is a ontrol of the player on agent i. A player an inuene
the subset of agents. The hoie of agents to be inuened is an important task
whih is not examined in the paper.
The player's goal is to maintain the opinion of soiety agents loser to a er-
tain level x̂ minimizing their osts on ontrol the agents' opinion. The following
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(xi(t)− x̂)2 + γu2i (t)
]
,
where δ ∈ (0; 1) is a disount fator, γ > 0 is the ost per unit ontrol.
In the next setions, we will examine the ase of three agents and two types of
ommuniation struture represented by a omplete and inomplete graphs. We also
assume that the player an inuene the opinion of a unique agent in the soiety.
3. Model with Communiation Struture Given by a Complete Graph
Consider a soiety dened by three agents who ommuniate with eah other




Fig. 1. Communiation struture represented by a omplete graph.
The dynamis of agents' opinion (state variable) is dened by the following
equations:
x1(t+ 1) = x1(t) + a1
(





x2(t+ 1) = x2(t) + a2
(





x3(t+ 1) = x3(t) + a3
(





or in vetor form:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), (2)
where x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), x3(t))




1− 2a13 a13 a13
a2














One an easily notie that matrix A is stohasti.







aets the opinion of only the seond agent. The player's aim is to ontrol the opinion
of the seond agent in suh a way as to inuene the opinion of two other agents
through agent 2 and make their opinions loser to the given value x̂ minimizing the








(xi(t)− x̂)2 + γu2(t)
]
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x′(t)Qx(t) + qx(t) + 3x̂2 + γu2(t)
]
, (3)
where Q = I3 is an identity matrix of size three and q = (−2x̂,−2x̂,−2x̂). We
should notie that the matrixQ is symmetri and positive denite. The optimization
problem is linear-quadrati.
In dynami games the information struture should be speied when players
design their strategies. In the following, we assume that the information struture is
feedbak Basar and Olsder, 1998, i.e. the player takes into aount time and state
whih an be observed. The feedbak strategy of the player is ψ(t, x) = u ∈ U .
In the following, we will write u(t) whih is the ontrol variable given by feedbak
strategy ψ(t, x) at time t.
We use dynami programming method. The Bellman equation for the minimiza-
tion problem takes the form:




(xi(t)− x̂)2 + γu2(t) + δV (t+ 1, x(t+ 1))
]
(4)
where x(t+ 1) satises equation (2). We an rewrite Bellman equation (4) as
V (t, x) = min
u(t)∈U
[
x′(t)Qx(t) + qx(t) + 3x̂2 + γu2(t) + δV (t+ 1, x(t+ 1))
]
(5)
Assuming that the value funtion assoiated with the minimization problem of
(3) be dened as

















 , k = (k1, k2, k3),
we an rewrite the value funtion as
V (t, x(t)) = x′(t)Kx(t) + kx(t) + k0. (6)
We assume the player uses feedbak strategies of the form
u(t, x(t)) = cx(t) + c0, (7)
where c = (c1, c2, c3) ∈ R3, c0 ∈ R1.
Substituting the expression of V (t+ 1, x(t+ 1)) from (6) and x(t+ 1) from (2),
we obtain the dynami programming equation given by
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V (t, x) = min
u(t)∈U
[
x′(t)Qx(t) + qx(t) + 3x̂2 + γu2(t)





x′(t)Qx(t) + qx(t) + 3x̂2 + γu2(t)
+ δ(Ax(t) +Bu(t))′K(Ax(t) +Bu(t)) + δk(Ax(t) +Bu(t)) + δk0
]
Solving minimization problem in the right-hand side, it implies







Taking into aount the linear form of ontrol variable (7), we obtain the expressions




δkB(γ + δB′KB)−1, (9)
c = −(γ + δB′KB)−1δB′KA. (10)
To nd vetor k and matrix K we substitute expressions of u and Bellman funtion
into (5) and obtain the following system:
x′(t)Kx(t) + kx(t) + k0 = x
′(t)Qx(t) + qx(t) + 3x̂2 + γ(cx(t) + c0)
2
+ δ [(A+Bc)x(t) +Bc0]
′
K [(A+Bc)x(t) +Bc0]
+ δk [(A+Bc)x(t) +Bc0] + δk0.
The vetor k, matrixK and onstant k0 an be found as the solution of the following
system:
K = Q+ γc′c+ δ(A+Bc)′K(A+Bc), (11)
k = q + 2γcc0 + δk(A+Bc) + 2δc0B
′K(A+Bc), (12)
k0 = 3x̂
2 + γc20 + δc0kB + δc
2
0(B)
′KB + δk0. (13)
Therefore, the optimal ontrol minimizing (3) with state dynamis (2) is dened
by (8) and solution of the system of equations (11)(13).
4. Model with Communiation Struture Given by an Inomplete
Graph
Consider a senario where one onnetion between agents (between agents 1 and
3) is missing. The player ontrols the opinion of the seond agent as in the previous
model and his task is to make the opinion of the agents loser to the target opinion
of x̂. The ommuniation graph is presented in Fig. 2.




Fig. 2. Communiation struture represented by an inomplete graph.
The opinion dynamis in this ase is given by the system







x2(t+ 1) = x2(t) + a2
(
















3), or in vetor form:
x(t+ 1) = A1x(t) +Bu(t), (14)
where x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), x3(t))




1− a12 a12 0
a2
3 1− 2a23 a23
0 a32 1− a32

 .
Making the similar alulations as in Setion 3, we obtain







Taking into aount the linear form of ontrol variable (7), we obtain the expressions




δkB(γ + δB′KB)−1, (16)
c = −(γ + δB′KB)−1δB′KA1, (17)
where vetor k and matrix K satisfy the following system:
Substituting the expressions of u and Bellman funtion V (t, x(t)) and obtain
the following system:
x′(t)Kx(t) + kx(t) + k0 = x
′(t)Qx(t) + qx(t) + x̂2 + γ(cx(t) + c0)
2
+ δ [(A1 +Bc)x(t) +Bc0]
′
K [(A1 +Bc)x(t) +Bc0]
+ δk [(A1 +Bc)x(t) +Bc0] + δk0.
The vetor k, matrixK and onstant k0 an be found as the solution of the following
system:
K = Q+ γc′c+ δ(A1 +Bc)
′K(A1 +Bc), (18)
k = q + 2γcc0 + δk(A1 +Bc) + 2δc0B
′K(A1 +Bc), (19)
k0 = 3x̂
2 + γc20 + δc0kB + δc
2
0(B)
′KB + δk0. (20)
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where vetor c and onstant c0 satisfy equations (17) and (16) respetively.
Therefore, the optimal ontrol minimizing (3) with state dynamis (14) is dened
by (15) and solution of the system of equations (18)(20).
5. Numerial Simulation
Using Wolfram Mathematia, we obtain numerial results that allow to analyze
and evaluate the onvergene of the opinions of agents, as well as the relationship of
the remaining parameters of the model with eah other. We assume that the initial
data of the rst and third agents are equal, as well as their oeients a1 = a3.
We onsider two examples, with omplete ommuniation graph and then with
inomplete graph.




3 = 0.4, x
0
2 = 0.7, (21)
a1 = a3 = 0.9, a2 = 0.8,
d = 0.6, γ = 0.1, x̂ = 1.
Solving system (2), taking into aount expressions (3), (4) and (7), the values
of the opinions of all partiipants are obtained, and the optimal ontrol trajetory
is determined. The results for the rst 20 periods are presented in Table 1.
t = 0 t = 2 t = 4 t = 6 t = 8 t = 10 t = 12 t = 14 t = 16 t = 18 t = 20
x1(t) 0.400 0.578 0.688 0.743 0.771 0.786 0.793 0.797 0.799 0.800 0.800
x2(t) 0.700 0.791 0.796 0.798 0.799 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.801 0.801 0.801
x3(t) 0.400 0.578 0.688 0.743 0.771 0.786 0.793 0.797 0.799 0.800 0.800
u(t) 0.245 0.116 0.059 0.04 0.030 0.015 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.0005 0.0002
Table 1. The dynamis of the optimal ontrol and opinions with the one player and three
agents for a numerial simulations with parameters (21) and omplete ommuniation
graph.











Fig. 3. The dynamis of opinions for three-agent model with omplete ommuniation
graph and parameters given by (21) (blue  agents 1 and 3, orange  agent 2).
Analyzing the data in Table 1, we onlude that the opinions of the agents,
starting from the moment t = 13, are as lose as possible to eah other, despite the
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fat that the initial data are dierent. This fat an be explained by the fat that
the individual oeients of agents 1 and 3 are greater than the oeient of agent
2, and the initial opinion is larger for agent 2.
The opinions are in some sense "stabilized" over time. The player ontrols the
opinions of the agents. As the opinions of the agents onverge, the optimal ontrol
tends to zero, demonstrating a dereasing form of a funtion. Graphs of agents'
opinions are presented in Fig. 3. The optimal ontrol trajetory is represented in
Fig. 4.








Fig. 4. The dynamis of optimal ontrol for three-agent model with omplete ommuni-
ation graph and parameters given by (21).
Now we onsider the seond example and ompare the models with omplete and
inomplete ommuniation struture. We use the following parameters for modeling:
x01 = x
0
3 = 0.4, x
0
2 = 0.5, (22)
a1 = a3 = 0.2, a2 = 0.5,
d = 0.6, γ = 0.5, x̂ = 0.6.
Solving systems (2) and (14), taking into aount expressions (3), (4), (7) and
(15), we obtain the solution inluding the agents' opinions and optimal ontrol
trajetory. In ontrast to the previous example, the solution was analyzed for more
than fty time periods. The results are presented in Table 2.
t = 0 t = 10 t = 20 t = 30 t = 40 t = 50
x1(t) 0.400 0.364 0.334 0.317 0.307 0.302
x2(t) 0.500 0.306 0.301 0.299 0.297 0.296
x3(t) 0.400 0.364 0.334 0.317 0.307 0.302
u(t) −0.107 −0.020 −0.011 −0.006 −0.004 −0.002
Table 2. The dynamis of the optimal ontrol and opinions for a numerial simulations
with parameters (22) and omplete ommuniation graph.
The numerial results of alulations of the opinions and optimal ontrols with
the parameters dened by (22) for the model with inomplete graph are presented
in Table 3.
332 Vladimir V. Mazalov, Yulia A. Dorofeeva, Elena M. Parilina
t = 0 t = 10 t = 20 t = 30 t = 40 t = 50
x1(t) 0.400 0.368 0.345 0.336 0.332 0.330
x2(t) 0.500 0.335 0.331 0.329 0.329 0.329
x3(t) 0.400 0.368 0.345 0.336 0.332 0.330
u(t) −0.086 −0.012 −0.005 −0.002 −0.001 −0.0003
Table 3. The dynamis of the optimal ontrol and opinions for a numerial simulations
with parameters (22) and inomplete ommuniation graph.










Fig. 5. The dynamis of opinions for three-agent model with omplete ommuniation
graph and parameters given by (22) (blue  agents 1 and 3, orange  agent 2).
The seond example is interesting as the individual oeient a2 of the seond
agent exeeds the oeients of agents a1, a3 by more than two times. However,
despite this fat, the opinions of all three agents have the same dereasing harater
in time interval [0; 50℄. Opinion dynamis for omplete ommuniation graph are
presented in Table 2 and Figure 5. The solution of the problem with inomplete
ommuniation struture is presented in Table 3 and Figure 6. Contrary to the
rst example, both models introdue slower hanges, although the target opinion
x̂ = 0.6 is less than in the rst example. The disount fator remains the same in
the seond example, but the value of γ is inreased in ve times, whih an be one
of the reasons aeting the nature of the hanges.










Fig. 6. The dynamis of opinions for three-agent model with inomplete ommuniation
graph and parameters given by (22) (blue  agents 1 and 3, orange  agent 2).
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For a model with inomplete ommuniation graph, the onvergene of opin-
ions is faster than for omplete graph. It an be explained by the following. With
inomplete ommuniation struture, agents 1 and 3 are isolated from diret "om-
muniation" with eah other, and they are inuened diretly only by agent 2 whose
ontrolled by the player. This diret ommuniation with the agent 2 and isolation
of agents 1 and 3 from eah other auses of rapid onvergene of opinions.







Fig. 7. The dynamis of optimal ontrol for three-agent model with omplete (blue) and
inomplete (orange) ommuniation graph and parameters given by (22).
Partiular attention should be paid to the optimal ontrol dynamis. Both on-
trol trajetories (for omplete and inomplete strutures) are represented in Figure
7. For a model with inomplete graph, the optimal ontrol onverges to zero faster
than in a model with omplete graph. Contrary to the rst example, the optimal
ontrol for both ases is an inreasing funtion of time. Moreover, the opinions for
the senario with inomplete ommuniation struture over the entire duration are
slightly larger than for the senario with omplete ommuniation struture, i.e.,
loser to the target value.
6. Conlusion
The problem of the dynamis of agents' opinions is onsidered in the paper. The
ommuniation struture is dened in the form by a omplete or inomplete graph
with three nodes representing the agents. The player ontrols agents' opinions via
one agent minimizing his osts on ontrol and the dierene between the target and
agents' opinions. The minimization problem is solved assuming feedbak information
struture using dynami programming method. The ontrol variable inuenes on
the onvergene of the agents' opinions to the target one. Therefore, the given
dynamis makes the proess the so-alled "preditable". The numerial value of
ontrol dereases in absolute value while the agents' opinions beome lose to the
target opinion. However, the seond important fator is the presene and absene of
onnetions between all members of the soiety. Despite hanges in the parameters
of the model, inomplete ommuniation struture between agents slows down the
onvergene of the system.
As an illustration of the theoretial results, we onsider examples with dierent
initial opinions of all members of the soiety, as well as the values of the disount
fator, dierent oeients in the ost funtion.
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These parameters aet the rate of the system onvergene. We provide the
important onlusions about onvergene of the system obtained from numerial
simulations:
 The higher the prie a player pays for ontrol, the slower the proess of onver-
gene.
 The proess depends on the initial opinions of the agents, i.e., the smaller the
dierene between them, the faster the onvergene.
It is worth noting that we onsider the optimization problem with one player,
so the problem is not a game. However, this study provides a broad perspetive for
the further study of oniting senarios, in the ase when there are more than one
player, and we an onsider the game as ompetition on agents' opinions (e.g., see
Mazalov and Parilina, 2019).
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